ents of NOEM models are imperfect competition in labor and/or product markets, nominal rigidities, and optimal price-setting behaviors leading to time-varying markups.
The NOEM also attempts to bridge the gap with the recent international trade literature, although the integration between the two research areas is, to say the least, far from complete. For instance, the macroeconomic analyses of openness and interdependence considered in NOEM models typically focus on the 'intensive'margin of international trade (exports and imports of a given set of varieties), downplaying or ruling out tout-court its 'extensive'margin (exports and imports of new varieties), even though the latter plays a key role in the new trade literature both at the theoretical and empirical level.
While recent work is slowly pushing the research frontier in these respects, the bulk of NOEM contributions do not allow for endogenous entry of …rms, the creation of new varieties of goods, or changes in the array of traded and nontraded good. The paper by Lubik and Schorfheide is no exception here.
While NOEM models come in di¤erent sizes and varieties, they usually tend to be skewed bimodally either toward the 'Bonsai'end of the complexity spectrum (simple qualitative models of predominantly theoretical interest), or toward the 'Godzilla'opposite end (large-scale multi-country DSGE models with a wealth of parametric features). Among the earliest and most in ‡uential examples of the …rst kind of models, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) has now reached the status and reputation of a modern classic. Models of the second type have found fertile grounds among central banks and policy institutions, with the Global Economy Model developed at the International Monetary Fund possibly representing the best-known application so far. 1 The paper by Lubik and Schorfheide is particularly welcome, as it repre-sents a relatively rare type of contribution equidistantly positioned between the two extreme poles of the complexity spectrum (let's call it the 'Totoro' region 2 ). In fact, the authors devote an entire section of the paper to discuss the …nely balanced trade-o¤s between misspeci…cation and identi…cation issues arising in DSGE models. However, this need not mean that theoretical and empirical aspects (or, if one prefers, speci…cation and estimation sides of the model) are given equal attention in the paper. In fact, the formal framework of the paper is a simple variant of the canonical NOEM model, and the theoretical setup turns out to be little more than a pretext for the application of state-of-the-art Bayesian estimation techniques.
In a nutshell, the paper considers a world economy equally split between two large trading partners, the United States (US) and the Euro Area (EU).
The two countries are symmetric in terms of technology and tastes (although tastes are skewed toward local goods, and such home bias in preferences implies that purchasing power parity (PPP) would not hold even if the law of one price held for all goods). They di¤er, however, in two important respects, both related to the speci…cation of the monetary economies: the mechanism of policy transmission (that is, size and persistence of nominal rigidities) is di¤erent across countries, and the interest rate rules followed by the two monetary authorities put di¤erent weights on output and in ‡ation gaps, presumably re ‡ecting di¤erent strategies and policy objectives.
Complete markets are assumed to exist both at the national and international level. For each tradable good the law of one price applies at the border level, that is, the price paid by the importer and the price received by the producer are equalized when expressed in terms of the same currency.
This implies complete pass-through of exchange rate movements onto import 2 'Tonari no Totoro' ('My neighbor Totoro') is a classic animation …lm by Hayao Miyazaki.
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prices at the border level. However, there is imperfect exchange rate passthrough at the consumer level, re ‡ecting the monopoly power of importers in the domestic retail market (we will return to this point shortly). Uncertainty is introduced in the model through a smorgasbord of shocks, including a nonstructural disturbance that is designed to measure exogenous deviations from PPP (see section 5.1).
While the approach of the paper is "deliberately parsimonious in order to focus on robustness and identi…cation instead of …t," one must of course acknowledge that this level of theoretical abstraction is not problem-free.
In fact, several simplifying (and unrealistic) assumptions -that make sense only in the minimalist context of the 'Bonsai'NOEM models -are imported without much discussion in the work by Lubik and Schorfheide, raising the possibility of (mild or severe) misspeci…cation.
Take for instance the assumption of complete markets and full international risk-sharing, according to which a set of contingent transfers guarantee that the real exchange rate moves in tandem with the ratio of marginal utilities of the representative households in the two countries (see eq. 30).
This assumption implies that, across countries, consumption should be higher where its price is lower. The problem is that this is not true at all in the data, as recognized by a long tradition of empirical work dating back to Backus and Smith (1993). Besides raising doubts about the ability of the model to …t the dynamic pro…le of the US-European current account, the crucial question is how empirically reliable should we judge the results of a methodology that forces the correlation between the two key variables in the analysisrelative consumption and real exchange rate -to be high when in the data it appears to be very low, if not negative.
Some problems with the model are discussed in the text -such as the absence of a nontraded sector, acknowledged in the conclusion. Other prob-lematic aspects are less obvious, such as the speci…cation of exchange rate pass-through. Recall that price stickiness and low pass-through arise at the consumer level. There is no pricing to market or imperfect pass-through at the border level: the importer-currency price of imports moves one to one with the exchange rate, but the price paid by the consumer is less elastic to changes in exchange rates (the empirical evidence is that pass-through is indeed higher at the import level than at the consumer level, although still imperfect).
In the model, producers operate under conditions of monopolistic competition. When they sell in the domestic market, facing a downward-sloping demand for their speci…c varieties, they exploit their monopoly power by charging a markup over their marginal costs. Due to nominal rigidities, there is asymmetric adjustment, price dispersion among producers and in ‡a-tion dynamics in the aggregate. When however the same producers sell their products to foreign importers, they do so at precisely the same price charged in the domestic market. In other words, they do not take into account the fact that the demand for their products abroad is a function of the consumer price set by the foreign importers. Since the latter is subject to nominal rigidities unrelated to those in the home market, the demand elasticities at home and abroad can be di¤erent. In this case, it is unlikely that the monopolistic producer/exporters …nd it optimal to give up their monopoly power and charge the same price both domestically and abroad.
Note that in a small open-economy model this particular way of modeling lower pass-through at the consumer level than at the border level would be perfectly valid, as importers face an exogenously given price for their import goods. In the general-equilibrium framework of the model, however, the postulated absence of price discrimination seems logically inconsistent with the principle of pro…t maximization. After estimating the model under the two speci…cations, the answer of the paper is a solomonic 'Yes and no. Depends'. In the European case, moving from a closed-to an open-economy setting seems to make quite a di¤erence.
But in the US case, not much di¤ers whether or not the model accounts for the imports sector. 4 As a result, openness makes monetary policies less asymmetric across countries.
What happens is that the estimated degree of price stickiness in the EU market for domestic goods increases substantially when we move from the autarkic speci…cation to the world-economy model. This result has important implications for EU monetary policy. When we allow for openness, the weight on in ‡ation falls in the estimated interest rate rule, and concern with the output gap becomes predominant in policy design. 
